Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Changes in Events and Changes in Things', 'Many, but almost one' and 'Four Decades of Scientific Explanation'

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26 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne [Prior,AN]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about) [Lewis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many [Lewis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it [Lewis]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon]
Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon]
Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon]
Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon]
The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon]
Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon]
A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon]
Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon]
Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon]
Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon]
Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it [Lewis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
'Thank goodness that's over' is not like 'thank goodness that happened on Friday' [Prior,AN]